The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
Administered Ministry: Ministry of Home Affairs / Department of Internal Security
Section
Section 21 Act of a child above seven and under twelve years of age of immature understanding.
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve years of age, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
Section 22 Act of a person of unsound mind.
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
Section 23 Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
Section 24 Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.
In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
Section 25 Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent.
Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm..
Illustration.
A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.
A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.
Section 26 Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's benefit.
Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration.
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Zs death, and intending, in good faith, Zs benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Zs consent. A has committed no offence.
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Zs death, and intending, in good faith, Zs benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Zs consent. A has committed no offence.
Section 27 Act done in good faith for benefit of child or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent of guardian.
Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person:
Provided that this exception shall not extend to---
(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration.
A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception, in as much as his object was the cure of the child.
Provided that this exception shall not extend to---
(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception, in as much as his object was the cure of the child.
Section 28 Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.
A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Sanhita,—.
(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or.
(b) if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or.
(c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or.
(b) if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or.
(c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
Section 29 Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused.
The exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence "by reason of such harm"; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence "by reason of such harm"; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
Section 30 Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent.
Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:
Provided that this exception shall not extend to--
(a) the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustrations.
(1) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned.
A, not intending Zs death, but in good faith, for Z's benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(2) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's benefit. A's bullet gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
(3) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child's guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. A has committed no offence.
(4) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the child from the house top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence.
Explanation.---Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section.
Provided that this exception shall not extend to--
(a) the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustrations.
(1) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned.
A, not intending Zs death, but in good faith, for Z's benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(2) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's benefit. A's bullet gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
(3) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child's guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. A has committed no offence.
(4) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the child from the house top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence.
Explanation.---Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section.
Section 31 Communication made in good faith.
No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration.
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death.
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death.
Section 32 Act to which a person is compelled by threats.
Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence:
Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1.--A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2.--A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.
Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1.--A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2.--A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.
Section 33 Act causing slight harm.
Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
Section 34 Things done in private defence.
Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
Section 35 Right of private defence of body and of property.
Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 37, to defend—.
(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;.
(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;.
(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
Section 36 Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc.
When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations.
(a) Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
Illustrations.
(a) Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
Section 37 Acts against which there is no right of private defence.
(1) There is no right of private defence, —
(a) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(b) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(c) in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
(2) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded.
(a) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(b) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(c) in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
(2) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded.
Section 38 When right of private defence of body extends to causing death.
The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—
(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;
(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release;
(g) an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.
(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;
(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release;
(g) an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.
Section 39 When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.
If the offence be not of any of the descriptions specified in section 38, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.
Section 40 Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of body.
The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.